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Abstract
Are claims more credible when made by multiple people, or is it the repetition 
of  claims that matters? Some research suggests that claims have more credibility 
when independent sources make them. Yet, other research suggests that simply 
repeating information makes it more accessible and encourages reliance on 
automatic processes—factors known to change people’s judgments. In 
Experiment 1, subjects took part in a “misinformation” study: Subjects first 
watched a video of  a crime and later read witness reports attributed to one or 
three different witnesses who made misleading claims in either one report or 
repeated the same misleading claims across all three reports. In Experiment 2, 
subjects who had not seen any videos read those same reports and indicated how 
confident they were that each claim happened in the original event. Subjects were 
more misled by—and more confident about—claims that were repeated, 
regardless of  how many witnesses made them. 
These findings led us to hypothesize that the repeated claims of  a single 
witness are seen as consistent, while the claims of  multiple witnesses are seen as 
having consensus. We tested this hypothesis in Experiments 3 and 4 by asking 
subjects who had not seen the video to read the reports that repeated the claims. 
In Experiment 3, half  of  the subjects read reports that contained some peripheral 
inconsistencies. In Experiment 4 all subjects read reports that contained 
inconsistencies, but half  of  the subjects were warned about the accuracy of  the 
inconsistent reports. Later, everyone indicated how confident they were that each 
claim really happened. Warning subjects about the inconsistent reports 
(Experiment 4) led them to rate the repeated claims of  a single witness—but not 
multiple witnesses—as less credible; A finding consistent with our hypothesis.
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In Experiment 5, we tested an alternative explanation that a failure to attend 
to the source of  the information may explain our findings by asking half  of  the 
subjects to complete a source monitoring component with their confidence test. 
We failed to find evidence for this explanation.
We conclude that subjects interpreted both the consistency of  a single 
witness's repeated claims, and the consensus among multiple witnesses' 
converging claims, as markers of  accuracy. Importantly, warning subjects about 
the accuracy of  the inconsistent reports reduced subjects’ confidence in the claims 
made by a single witness, but not multiple witnesses. These findings fit with 
research showing that repeating information makes it seem more true, and 
highlight the power of  a single repeated voice.
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Chapter 1
People who witness the same event will often remember it differently: a 
student remembers her teacher saying that the father of  psychology is Freud, 
while another remembers it being Wundt; one person at the parade remembers 
hearing shots coming from the grassy knoll while another remembers hearing 
shots from the book depository; a witness testifies in court that the burglar fled the 
scene in an electrical company van—another remembers the van with a different 
company name. “I saw the burglar drive off  in an RJ's electricians van,” Aidan 
mistakenly reports to Emily, who remembers it as an AJ's electricians van. These 
differences can even lead people to be misled about what really happened: the 
father of  psychology becomes Freud, the shots come from the grassy knoll, and 
Emily’s memory contains RJ’s electricians (French, Garry, & Mori, 2008; 
Gabbert, Memon, & Allen, 2003).1
We also know that repeated misleading claims do more damage to people's 
memories than claims made only once (Mitchell & Zaragoza, 1996; Zaragoza & 
Mitchell, 1996). What we do not know is the answer to two questions: Does one 
person who repeats misleading claims do more damage to people's memories 
than that same person making the claim only once? And when those misleading 
claims are repeated, does it matter how many people make those claims? For 
instance, suppose a witness (call him Aidan) tells other witnesses, "The burglar 
drove an RJ's electrician's van." Would Aidan’s claim do more damage to another 
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1 Portions of this thesis appeared in: 
Foster, J. L., Huthwaite, T., Yesberg, J. A., Garry, M., & Loftus, E. F. (2012). Repetition, not number of sources, increases 
both susceptibility to misinformation and confidence in the accuracy of eyewitnesses. Acta Psychologica, 139, 
320-326. doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2011.12.004 
But I have expanded on the introduction, data, analysis and discussion in this document.
witness’s memory if  Aidan states the claim once, or repeats it three times? By 
contrast, suppose that Aidan says, "The burglar drove an RJ's electrician's van." 
Later, another witness (Ben) also says the burglar drove an RJ's electrician's van, 
and still later a third witness (Cheryl) says the same thing. Would Aidan, Ben and 
Cheryl’s converging claims damage another witness’s memory more than if  
Aidan had simply repeated the same claim three times? Put another way, do 
claims do more damage when made by multiple sources, or is it the repetition of  
claims that matters? That is the question I address in this thesis.2
The Misinformation Effect
Nearly four decades of  research shows that even the unrepeated, misleading 
claims of  a lone eyewitness often damage memory. In a classic study, subjects 
watched a simulated auto accident in which a car stopped at a stop sign (Loftus, 
Miller, & Burns, 1978). Later, when they were asked questions about the accident, 
half  of  the subjects read a misleading detail in the stem of  the question—that the 
car was stopped at a yield sign, rather than the stop sign. Later, everyone was 
asked to identify what they saw in the accident. Subjects who read the misleading 
details were more likely to falsely recognize a scene containing a yield sign than 
subjects who were not given the misleading detail. In short, subjects incorporated 
the misleading details from the question, into their memory reports of  the event.
This finding, known as the misinformation effect (Tousignant, Hall, & Loftus, 
1986), has been demonstrated in thousands of  published studies from laboratories 
in many countries. As of  2012, 1,456 published papers contain the search terms 
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2  Although the research in this thesis is my own, I conducted it in a lab and supervised a team comprised of research 
assistants and honors students. I also received advice and direction from my supervisors. Therefore, I often use the word 
"we" in this thesis to reflect that fact. As you will also see, I use the word "we" in a different context to refer to what is 
known (or not known) in the wider scientific community.
misinformation effect, misleading postevent, or misleading information.3 This research shows 
that a range of  both cognitive and social factors can influence people’s 
susceptibility to misinformation. 
For example, on the cognitive side, people who score low on measures of  
intelligence are more likely to be misled than people who score high (Zhu et al., 
2010); children are more likely to be misled than young adults (Sutherland & 
Hayne, 2001; Exp. 2); and people given placebo alcohol are more likely to be 
misled than people who are told the drink is a placebo (Assefi & Garry, 2003). 
Perhaps more interestingly, social factors also influence people’s susceptibility 
to the misinformation effect. In one study, researchers asked subjects to watch a 
slideshow of  a mock crime and then listen to a recording of  a summary of  the 
crime that contained misinformation (Vornik, Sharman, & Garry, 2003). The 
recordings were of  a person using one of  two different accents. Subjects who 
heard a socially attractive accent on the recording were more likely to be misled 
than subjects who heard a less socially attractive accent. Other social cues can 
affect people’s susceptibility to misinformation as well. For example, people are 
more likely to be misled by their romantic partners than a stranger and less likely 
to be misled by people with a motivation to lie than people without a motivation 
to lie (Dodd & Bradshaw, 1980; French et al., 2008). 
Taken together, these findings that both social and cognitive cues can affect 
people's susceptibility to misinformation suggests that both the number of  times 
misleading claims are made, and the number of  people making those claims, may 
affect people's susceptibility to misinformation. More specifically, the number of  
times a claim is made may make it more cognitively available—that is it comes to 
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3 This figure was found using the PsycINFO database, and included the variant spelling post-event.
mind more easily—while the number of  people making the claims may act as a 
social cue for accuracy.
The Source Monitoring Framework
How does misleading information cause people to make these memory 
errors? The most promising account involves the source monitoring framework, 
which describes the process by which people distinguish true and false memories 
(Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Lindsay, 2008). According to the source 
monitoring framework, people use the qualitative characteristics of  memories—
such as how vivid or clear the memory is—to distinguish the source of  that 
memory. For example, when waking after a nightmare, people can draw on the 
characteristics of  the dream (such as the smells, sounds, etc.), matching them up 
with the characteristics they expect from reality to recognize that they were not 
really being chased by whatever their imagination has created. What follows is 
that when the characteristics of  a dream or other mental products rival those of  
reality, people may fail to distinguish between the two. 
How does the source monitoring framework account for the misinformation 
effect? When given misleading post-event information and later asked what 
happened in the original event, people’s memory of  the misleading information 
may have qualitative characteristics that rival those of  true memories. As a result, 
people confuse the misinformation for genuine experience. Research supports this  
idea: Asking people to identify the source of  misinformation reduces the 
misinformation effect. In one study, subjects looked at a photo of  a cluttered 
office space (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989). Later, they read a text about what was 
shown in the photo, but for half  of  the subjects, the text mentioned some items 
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that were not actually in the photo. Later, half  of  the subjects were asked to 
complete a source monitoring test in which they identified whether certain items were 
mentioned in the text only, seen in the photo only, completely new, or both 
mentioned in the text and seen in the photo. The other half  of  the subjects 
simply responded yes or no to whether they saw the item in the photo. They 
found that subjects given the source monitoring test more accurately recognized 
that the misled items were not from the photo than subjects who completed the 
standard—yes/no—recognition test. This finding demonstrates that the more 
effortful monitoring processes that the source monitoring test is thought to drive 
can reduce people’s susceptibility to more heuristically driven source monitoring 
errors.
A failure to accurately monitor the source of  a memory can lead to more than 
just belief  in things that are not true. Memory implantation research has led 
people to remember entire fictitious events such as taking a ride in a hot-air-
balloon, spilling a punch bowl at a wedding, and being attacked by a dog 
(Hyman, Husband, & Billings, 1995; Porter, Yuille, & Lehman, 1999; Wade, 
Garry, Read, & Lindsay, 2002). More importantly, the same source monitoring 
mechanisms thought to drive errors in belief, are also considered to be responsible 
for people remembering entire fictitious events.
In other words, we might think of  these memory errors as source monitoring 
failures. But while failures in source monitoring may make people believe things 
that are not true, we rely on source monitoring for a variety of  every day 
activities. More specifically, we use source monitoring to avoid inadvertent 
plagiarism, know whether your memory of  turning off  the iron was from this 
morning or yesterday morning, and to decide whether to trust other people's 
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memories (Brown & Murphy, 1989; Johnson, Bush, & Mitchell, 1998; Lindsay, 
2008).
Trusting Multiple Sources
In fact, we sometimes put more trust in our own memories of  an event when 
others remember it the same way. In one study, pairs of  family members or 
friends were asked to think of  an event that they each remembered differently 
(Ross, Buehler, & Karr, 1998). The pairs listed each step of  the event and rated 
how confident they were in their memories of  each step. People put more trust in 
their own memories of  each step when their partner remembered that step the 
same way than when their partner did not.
Similarly, we put more trust in the overlapping portion of  a group of  other 
people’s memories than the non-overlapping portion. In another study, subjects 
saw maps of  where three different witnesses had reported seeing the body of  a 
missing person (Harris & Hahn, 2009). The maps described a broad area (such as 
a neighborhood) rather than a specific location. Later, subjects reported the 
probabilities of  where the person was located. The results showed that subjects 
put more trust in the areas where witnesses overlapped than the areas where they 
did not overlap.
Our trust in multiple witnesses who have reached a consensus is justified: 
Consensus among a group of  people can be a good measure of  what is true (de 
Puiseau, Aßfalg, Erdfelder, & Bernstein, in press). More specifically, multiple 
witnesses identifying the same suspect are generally more accurate than a single 
witness identifying the suspect (Clark & Wells, 2008). People seem to know this 
14 
principle intuitively, and put more faith in the claims of  multiple witnesses than 
the unrepeated claims of  a single witness (McAllister & Bregman, 1986). 
Taken together, these findings suggest that the number of  people making a 
misleading claim should affect people’s susceptibility to misinformation over and 
above the number of  times the claim is made.
The Power of  Repetition
The Truth Effect. 
We know from research on the truth effect that people tend to believe 
information is more likely to be true when they have seen that information before. 
Specifically, the more times people have seen that information the more true they 
will believe it is (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Arkes, Boehm, & Xu, 1991; 
Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, & Wänke, 2010; Kelley & Lindsay, 1993; Lindsay, 2008; 
Unkelbach, 2007; Unkelbach & Stahl, 2009). Why might people believe 
information is true simply because it was repeated? One explanation of  the truth 
effect is that the repeated information becomes more cognitively available. This 
accessibility leads to feelings of  familiarity—feelings that are often interpreted as 
truth (Kelley & Lindsay, 1993; Lindsay, 2008). As a result, repeated information 
feels more true than unrepeated information.
The research on the truth effect also suggests that the number of  times a 
claim is made might be more important than the number of  people who say it. 
When misleading information is repeated it may become more cognitively 
available, leading people to believe it is more true—regardless of  how many 
people say it.
Repetition. 
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We also know that repetition affects more than just people’s perceptions of  
truth. For example, simply repeating information can change the judgments a 
person makes about that information. Subjects in one study were asked to read 
aloud a list of  names of  non-famous people (e.g., Sebastian Weisdorf). The next 
day, subjects read another list of  names containing both famous (e.g., Christopher 
Wren) and non-famous names. When subjects were asked to identify which names 
were famous and which names were not famous, the non-famous names from the 
day before became famous. In other words, people tended to mistakenly call a 
non-famous name famous if  they had read the name the day before (Jacoby, 
Kelley, Brown, & Jasechko, 1989).
Repetition can even affect our financial choices. We know that people will like 
a stock more after repeatedly viewing news reports about it—even when those 
news reports are from the same day. In that study, subjects watched several news 
reports about a specific stock (Unkelbach, Fiedler, & Freytag, 2007). For half  of  
the subjects, the same day’s news report about the stock increasing in price was 
shown from a separate television channel. Later, subjects were asked how much 
they liked the stock. Unkelbach et al., found that as the number of  news reports 
showing an increasing price repeated, subjects liked the stock more—even if  the 
news reports simply repeated from the same day. Interestingly, this effect 
continued even when subjects were warned about the repetition of  news reports 
from the same day. 
Repetition can also change our personal memories. In one study, university 
students looked at photos of  university campus locations both on their campus 
and from a completely novel campus in another state (Brown & Marsh, 2008). 
Later, these students looked at photos from both campus locations, and tried to 
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identify if  they had ever visited any of  those locations. The more times subjects 
had seen a photo from a novel campus, the more likely they were to falsely 
remember having visited that campus.
Finally, repetition can skew our sense of  other people's approval (Weaver 
Garcia, Schwarz, & Miller, 2007). Subjects in one study read about the opinions 
of  New Jersey homeowners who were in favor of  putting more parks into their 
neighborhoods. Some subjects read only a single opinion from a single 
homeowner, while others read three opinions that were attributed either to three 
different homeowners or all to the same homeowner. Later, subjects reported 
what percentage of  all homeowners they believed were in favor of  the parks. 
Subjects believed those opinions were more prevalent among homeowners when 
they read three opinions than when they read only one opinion—even when 
subjects knew all three opinions were from the same homeowner's opinion being 
repeated. In other words, people believed that one person’s opinion better 
represented the population’s opinion when it was repeated than when it was not.
The feelings of  familiarity that arise from repetition may likely increase 
people’s susceptibility to misinformation. Indeed, feelings of  familiarity are 
thought to be one driver of  the misinformation effect: When people are exposed 
to misleading postevent information, that postevent information becomes familiar 
to them. Later, people cannot easily differentiate the sources of  their feelings of  
familiarity. In other words, people cannot tell whether those misleading details 
feel familiar because they saw them, or because they heard about them later 
(Johnson et al., 1993; Lindsay, 2008). Considered as a whole, this research on the 
effects of  repetition suggests that the number of  times a claim is made might be 
more important than the number of  people who say it.
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Indeed, some research on the misinformation effect suggests that the number 
of  different witnesses who report misleading information should not matter as 
much as the number of  times they report that misinformation. For instance, 
repeated misinformation misleads people more than unrepeated misinformation; 
the likely explanation is that although people find repeated misinformation more 
familiar, they have no accompanying increase in their ability to monitor the 
source of  that familiarity (Zaragoza & Mitchell, 1996).
Repetition From Multiple Sources
Zaragoza & Mitchell’s (1996) findings also suggests that repetition and the 
number of  sources repeating misinformation may both play an important role in 
people's susceptibility to misinformation. In other words, the number of  times a 
claim is made and the number of  people who say it might interact.More 
specifically, Zaragoza and Mitchell asked subjects to read misleading questions 
about a film, and found that subjects who were misled multiple times were more 
likely to incorporate that misinformation into their memory reports than subjects 
that were misled only once. But when the researchers repeated misinformation 
using multiple presentation styles (written, video, audio), subjects were even more 
misled than when they repeated misinformation using only one presentation style 
(Mitchell & Zaragoza, 1996).
However, Mitchell and Zaragoza’s manipulation of  presentation styles differs 
from a manipulation of  the number of  sources in important ways. Perhaps most 
importantly, is that their manipulation was not one that would warrant any 
change in the information’s credibility. That is, presenting information in a variety 
of  formats does not, in itself, make it more likely to be true. In contrast, a group 
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consensus—or information repeated from multiple sources—generally does make 
that information more likely to be true (Clark & Wells, 2008; de Puiseau et al., in 
press). In light of  this difference, our research addresses how the number of  
sources—rather than the number of  presentation styles—affects people’s 
susceptibility to misinformation.
Other research shows that trustworthiness matters as well: Repeated 
information from a trustworthy source becomes more believable than repeated 
information from an untrustworthy source (Begg, Anas, & Farinacci, 1992; 
Unkelbach & Stahl, 2009). Taken together, this research suggests that if  one 
person repeats a claim it might make that claim more misleading than were it not 
repeated—but if  several people all make the same claim, it might trump 
repetition alone, making that claim more misleading still.
Overview
In our first two experiments, we explore whether what matters is the number 
of  times information is given or the number of  people who give that information. 
In Experiment 1, we asked if  repeating misleading claims changes the way 
subjects report details about a witnessed event, regardless of  how many witnesses 
repeat those claims.
In Experiment 2, we asked if  repeating testimony changes the way subjects 
judge the credibility of  the information they provide, regardless of  how many 
witnesses repeat that testimony. To answer this question, subjects followed a 
similar method to Experiment 1, but did not witness the original event. Instead, 
they merely read witness descriptions of  the event, and rated their confidence on 
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whether certain details in the reports were true. In Experiments 3 through 5, we 
explore the mechanisms that might drive the findings from Experiments 1 and 2. 
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Chapter 2
Experiment 1
The primary purpose of  Experiment 1 was twofold: to determine if  repeated,  
misleading claims change the way subjects report details about a witnessed event, 
and to determine if  the number of  witnesses repeating those misleading claims 
matters. To answer this question, subjects took part in an experiment using the 
misinformation paradigm (Loftus et al., 1978; Mitchell & Zaragoza, 1996; 
Takarangi, Parker, & Garry, 2006).
In Experiment 1, subjects first watched a video of  an electrician who stole 
items while doing repairs at a client’s house. Later, they read three eyewitness 
police reports—ostensibly written over three consecutive days—about the 
activities of  the electrician. Sometimes, all three reports misled subjects about 
what happened in the video; other times only one of  the three reports misled 
subjects. To manipulate how many witnesses wrote the reports, we told half  the 
subjects that three different witnesses made these reports; we told the other half  
that the same witness made all three reports. For example, subjects read three 
witness reports from Day 1, Day 2, and Day 3: For half  of  the subjects, 
Eyewitness 5 made the Day 1 report; Eyewitness 9 made the Day 2 report, and 
Eyewitness 16 made the Day 3 report. The other half  read the same reports—but 
all three reports were attributed to Eyewitness 9. Later, we asked everyone to take 
a surprise memory test to tell us what they saw in the event. 
Method
Subjects
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Sixty-four introductory psychology students completed the experiment as part 
of  a course requirement. 
Design
We used a 2 (report repetition: repeated, not repeated) x 2 (source: one 
witness, three witnesses) x 2 (item type: misled, control) mixed factors design 
manipulating repetition and source between subjects, and item type within 
subjects. Unless otherwise noted, subjects were evenly distributed between 
conditions in all experiments.
Procedure
We adapted materials from Takarangi et al. (2006). Subjects took part in 
groups of  no more than five; as Figure 2.1 shows, the experiment proceeded in 
three phases.
Phase 1. In the first phase, subjects watched a 6 minute and 34 second video 
of  an electrician named “Eric” stealing items from a client’s house on individual 
laptops. There were two versions of  the video, which were identical in all respects 
with the exception of  eight digitally altered critical items (see Figure 2.1). Video 
version was counterbalanced across subjects. After watching the video, subjects 
completed a 15 minute Sudoku filler task.
Phase 2. In the second phase, subjects read three witness reports ostensibly 
written by subjects in a previous experiment. In fact, the experimenters had 
written the witness reports, which described the electrician’s actions. Reports were 
prominently labeled as: 1) the transcript of  a police interview; 2) a written police 
statement; and 3) the transcript of  a followup police interview; each report was 
dated to show that they were completed across three consecutive days.4
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4 Samples of  these witness reports appear in Appendix C.
Figure 2.1. Illustration of Experiment 1 methods. In Phase 1, subjects watched a video of a mock crime containing eight 
critical items that were digitally manipulated between two versions. In Phase 2, subjects read three witness reports 
attributed to either one witness or three different witnesses. Some subjects read three reports with misleading details (the 
gray reports) while others read one report with misleading details and two control reports (the white reports) with no 
misleading details. In Phase 3, subjects took a surprise, two-alternative forced choice recognition test about what they 
remembered from the video and were asked to rate their confidence in their answer.
For each of  the three reports, we prepared two versions: a control version and 
a misleading version. The control versions (indicated by the white reports in 
Figure 2.1) described all eight critical items generically—for example, the van that 
Eric drove was described only as a “blue van.” The misleading versions (the gray 
reports in Figure 2.1) described four of  the eight critical items inaccurately—the 
van, for instance, was described as a “blue AJ’s Electricians van” when subjects 
had actually seen a blue RJ’s Electricians van. The remaining four critical items 
were described only generically. In short, misleading reports misled subjects on 
four critical items (blue AJ’s Electricians van; Time magazine), while the 
remaining four critical items—and all eight critical items in the control reports—
did not give any specific details (blue van; magazine).
We counterbalanced combinations of  movie version and witness reports so 
that—across the misleading reports—each item appeared twice as a misleading 
item and twice as a control item. In total, there were four versions of  each 
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misleading report, plus a control version for a total of  15 versions [3 witness 
reports x (4 misleading versions + 1 control version)].
The middle panel of  Figure 2.1 illustrates the two variables we manipulated in 
this phase: source and repetition. To manipulate source, we told half  the subjects 
they would read three reports from three randomly selected witnesses; we told the 
other half  that they would read three reports from one randomly selected witness. 
Subjects read the reports in the same order. When everyone had finished reading 
a report, the experimenter handed over the next one, emphasizing that it had 
come from either a different witness or the same witness. Each report was clearly 
labeled with a random witness number that either changed between each report, 
or remained the same on all three reports. To manipulate repetition, half  of  the 
subjects read two control reports and only one misleading report (to simplify the 
counterbalancing scheme, either the first or third report); the other half  read 
three misleading reports. 
In summary, there were four between-subjects conditions: 1) three witnesses, 
each making the same misleading claims across the three reports (subset iv in 
Figure 2.1); 2) one witness making the same claims across the three reports (iii); 3) 
three witnesses, only one of  whom makes the claims in only one report (ii); and 4) 
one witness who makes the claims in only one report (i). After reading the three 
reports, subjects completed a three minute pattern-completion filler task.
Phase 3. In this final phase, subjects completed a surprise recognition test; a 
two-alternative forced choice recognition test asking about details from the movie. 
We instructed them that the questions were about their memory for the video. For 
the eight critical items, they chose between the correct and misled option; the 
remaining 12 items served as fillers. Subjects circled their responses and rated 
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their confidence on a five-point scale (1 = Not at all Confident, 5 = Very 
Confident).5 Afterwards, they were debriefed.
Results and Discussion
Memory
Did repeating misleading claims change the way subjects reported details 
about the event—and if  so, did the number of  witnesses repeating those claims 
matter? To address these questions, we calculated each subject’s mean accuracy 
for the eight critical items. We classified these data first by whether they were 
control or misled details, second according to the number of  witnesses, and third 
according to how many reports contained those misled critical details. These 
results appear in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2. Mean Accuracy of Misled and Control Claims by Repetition and Number of Witnesses in Experiment 1. Error 
bars represent a 95% confidence interval.
Figure 2.2 shows three important findings. First, the white bars show that 
when subjects were not exposed to misinformation, they were accurate at 
remembering how the crime unfolded. Second, the comparison between the first 
and second black bars, as well as the third and fourth black bars, show that 
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5 The recognition test appears in Appendix D.
repetition mattered: When misleading claims were repeated, subjects were less 
accurate than when misleading claims were not repeated. Third, subjects were no 
less accurate about repeated misleading claims from three witnesses than they 
were about repeated misleading claims from a single witness. These results tell us 
that it was the repetition of  misleading claims that mattered, not how many 
sources the repeated misinformation came from.
In other words, a 2 (report repetition) x 2 (source) x 2 (item type) ANOVA 
revealed a significant interaction between item type and report repetition, F(1,60) 
= 5.35, p = .02, ηp2 = .08. Followup t-tests revealed that regardless of  how many 
witnesses made the reports, repetition decreased accuracy in misleading claims (M  
= 0.49, SD = 0.22) relative to unrepeated misleading claims (M = 0.63, SD = 
0.22), t(62) = 2.53, p = .01, Cohen’s d = 0.64. There was no difference in the 
accuracy of  control claims between the repeated (M = 0.77, SD = 0.21) and 
unrepeated (M = 0.74, SD = 0.18) conditions, t(62) = 0.47, p = .64, d = 0.12, and 
no tests of  source were significant (all Fs ≤ 1.21).
Taken together, these results suggest that the number of  people who made a 
claim did not matter as much as the number of  times the claim was made. That 
is, if  Aidan repeatedly tells Emily the incorrect name of  the burglar’s electrical 
company, Emily will be more misled than if  Aidan had told her only once. 
Interestingly, if  that claim were repeated it would make little difference if  Aidan 
said it, or if  Aidan, Ben, and Cheryl each had made the same claim once: either 
way Emily hears it three times and is similarly misled.
Confidence
Subjects were more confident about their responses to misled items (M = 
3.81, SD = 0.66) than control items (M = 3.55, SD = 0.66), a finding well 
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documented in the misinformation effect literature (e.g., Takarangi et al., 2006). 
But their confidence did not depend on the number of  times misinformation was 
repeated, nor the number of  witnesses. In other words, a 2 (source) X 2 
(repetition) X 2 (item type) ANOVA revealed a main effect of  item type, F(1,60) = 
6.74, p = .01, ηp2 = .10. There were no other effects (all Fs ≤ 1.35).
Counterexplanations and Criticisms
One counterexplanation for our results is that subjects paid little attention to 
whether one or three witnesses repeated the statements. If  so, our results might 
reflect the fact that they attended to the misleading claims, but not to who 
reported those claims. To address this hypothesis, we examined the data from 
subjects who read the misleading claims in only one report (n = 32). When 
reports were attributed to three witnesses, subjects were similarly accurate about 
specific claims appearing in the third (M = 0.66, SD = 0.19) and first (M = 0.59, 
SD = 0.23) reports t(14) = 0.60, p = .56 , d = 0.16. However, when reports were 
attributed to one witness subjects were marginally less misled for misleading 
claims appearing in the third (M = 0.75, SD = 0.19) rather than the first (M = 
0.53, SD = 0.25) report, t(14) = 1.99, p = .07, d = 0.99.6 This finding fits with the 
idea that when a single witness made all three reports, a claim appearing for the 
first time in the third report seemed less trustworthy. They also suggest that 
subjects noticed whether repeated claims were made by one or three witnesses, 
yet noticing the source of  these claims did not affect subjects’ accuracy. 
A critic might suggest that because subjects read about control claims three 
times, repetition improved memory for those items. In other words, reading “blue 
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6 This finding may also explain why subjects who read misleading claims attributed to one witness but only in one report (the first set 
of bars in Figure 2.2) showed no misinformation effect. When subjects read misleading claims in the third report, they were not 
misled; when other subjects read those misleading claims in the first report, they showed the typical misinformation effect. Averaging 
these data together, there was no overall misinformation effect.
van” three times cued subjects who saw a blue AJ’s van to remember—correctly
—that they had indeed seen a blue AJ’s van. Such a mechanism, which is 
reminiscent of  the testing effect (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006), would serve to 
make control performance unusually high. But even if  the critic were correct, 
repeated references to control claims should have no effect on how well subjects 
remember the misled claims which did not contain these repeated, control, 
references.
Of  course, it is one thing if  repeating misinformation three times makes 
subjects less accurate about what they saw. Years of  research on the 
misinformation effect has shown that people make these errors because of  an 
inability to differentiate the sources of  what they originally saw and what they 
later read (Johnson et al., 1993; Lindsay, 2008)—repeating misinformation may 
simply add more opportunities for people to make these types of  errors. In other 
words, trying to distinguish between four sources—the original event and 
misleading information presented three times—may be more difficult than trying 
to distinguish between two sources—the original event and misleading 
information presented only once. 
But it would be another thing if  repeating that information changed people’s 
beliefs about what happened when they never saw the crime unfold in the first 
place. On the face of  it, judging what happened when you didn’t see the crime 
would appear to be qualitatively different than remembering what happened 
when you did see the crime. Indeed, the source confusion thought to drive the 
misinformation effect should play little role in altering people’s beliefs about what 
really happened because they did not see the crime; by definition, there is no 
original source with which to confuse the witness reports. But a different kind of  
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source monitoring error might lead people to put more stock into a single witness 
who repeats his claims than if  he were to make the same claim only once. In one 
study, when one group of  subjects read a New Jersey homeowner’s repeated 
opinions about preserving open spaces, they thought his views more 
representative of  the wider population of  homeowners than another group who 
read his opinion only once (Weaver et al., 2007). The idea is that repeating claims  
makes them seem more familiar, more available, and more true (Kelley & Lindsay,  
1993; Unkelbach, 2007). If  a similar mechanism applies to people’s confidence in 
eyewitness claims, we should see that the repeated claims of  one witness are more 
credible to people who never saw the crime than if  that witness simply states them 
once. We addressed this issue in Experiment 2.
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Chapter 3
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, subjects read the same three witness reports from 
Experiment 1, but did not witness the event. Thus, they could not know if  claims 
about how the crime unfolded were true. After they read the witness reports, 
subjects reported their confidence that each claim was true.
Method
Subjects 
Ninety six introductory psychology students participated for a course 
requirement.
Design
We used a 2 (report repetition: repeated, not repeated) x 2 (source: one 
witness, three witnesses) x 2 (item type: specific, control) mixed factors design, 
manipulating repetition and source between subjects, and item type within 
subjects.
Procedure
The procedure described below was the same as Experiment 1 with three 
exceptions: 1) subjects did not complete Phase 1—we omitted the video and the 
respective 15 minute filler task; 2) we changed the filler task between the reports 
and testing phases to 7 minutes; and 3) in the testing phase, subjects reported 
their confidence that the claim was true. 
Because the reports no longer corresponded to a witnessed video, what we 
described as misleading claims in Experiment 1 were no longer misleading in 
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Experiment 2. As such, we call those claims specific claims in Experiment 2, 
because they specifically describe a critical detail.
Subjects began the experiment by reading the three witness reports, following 
procedures identical to those in Experiment 1. After reading all three witness 
reports, subjects worked on a filler task for 7 minutes. In the testing phase, they 
completed a 20 item test to assess what they thought had occurred during the 
crime. Each item claimed that a specific detail or action had occurred, and was 
followed by this question: “How confident are you that this statement is correct?” 
Four of  the eight critical test items were the same as the specific detail mentioned 
in the witness reports. For example, subjects who read that Eric was driving an 
“AJ’s Electricians van” were asked how confident they were that “The name of  
Eric’s company was AJ’s Electricians”. The remaining four critical test items still 
asked about the specific version of  the claim (“AJ’s Electricians”), although 
subjects had read only about the control version of  the claim in the reports (a 
blue van).7 Thus, we would expect subjects to have lower confidence about 
control claims relative to their confidence about specific claims. Afterwards, they 
were debriefed.
Results and Discussion
Confidence in Repeated Claims
Did repeating claims make subjects more confident that they really happened
—and if  so, did the number of  witnesses repeating those claims matter? To 
address this question, we calculated each subject’s mean confidence that specific 
details or actions had taken place. We classified these data first according to 
whether the critical items were described in a specific or control level of  detail in 
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7 A sample confidence test appears in Appendix D.
the reports, second according to how many witnesses the reports were attributed, 
and third according to how many reports contained critical items in a specific 
level of  detail. These results appear in Figure 3.1.
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Figure  3.1.  Mean  Con1idence  Ratings  of  Speci1ic  and  Control   Claims  by   Repetition  and  Number  of  Witnesses  in  Experiment   2.  Error  bars  represent  a  95%  con1idence  interval.
Figure 3.1 shows three important findings. The first is unsurprising: The 
white bars show that when subjects read only control claims in the reports, they 
were not very confident that the crime had unfolded in the specific way asserted 
in the test. Second, the comparison between the first and second black bars, as 
well as the third and fourth black bars, show that repeating claims mattered: 
When subjects read the same specific claim repeated, they were more confident 
that those claims were correct than when the claims were not repeated. Third, 
subjects were similarly confident about repeated claims regardless of  the number 
of  witnesses who made those claims. More specifically, subjects were no more 
confident about claims repeated by three different witnesses than they were about 
claims repeated by a single witness.
In other words, a 2 (report repetition) x 2 (source) x 2 (level of  detail) ANOVA 
revealed a significant interaction between level of  detail and report repetition, 
F(1,92) = 11.50, p < .01, ηp2 = .11. Moreover, regardless of  how many witnesses 
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made the reports, subjects were more confident about repeated specific claims (M 
= 4.44, SD = 0.63) than unrepeated specific claims (M = 3.80, SD = 0.75), t(94) = 
4.50, p < .01, d = 0.92. There was no difference in people’s confidence in the 
control claims between the repeated (M = 2.00, SD = 0.71) and unrepeated (M = 
1.99, SD = 0.70) conditions, t(94) = 0.04, p = .97, d < 0.01, and no tests of  source 
were significant (all Fs < 1). Taken together, these results suggest that the number 
of  people who made a claim did not matter as much as the number of  times the 
claim was made.
Counterexplanation
As in Experiment 1, we tested the counterexplanation that subjects paid little 
attention to whether statements were made by one or three witnesses; the pattern 
of  the data was consistent with that in Experiment 1. When reports were 
attributed to three witnesses, subjects were similarly confident about specific 
claims in the third (M = 3.94, SD = 0.85) and first (M = 3.67, SD = 0.63) reports 
t(22) = 0.89, p = .38 , d = 0.36. However, when reports were attributed to a single 
witness, subjects were less confident when specific claims appeared in the third (M 
= 3.46, SD = 0.77) rather than the first (M = 4.15, SD = 0.64) report, t(22) = 2.38,  
p = .03, d = 0.97. These findings suggest that subjects did pay attention to 
whether repeated claims were made by one or three witnesses, yet noticing the 
source of  these claims did not affect subjects’ confidence.
Summary of  Experiments 1 and 2
In two experiments, we asked if  one person who repeats claims wields more 
influence on memory and confidence than that same person making the claim 
only once. The answer is yes. Across both experiments, the data converged on the 
important role of  repetition. In Experiment 1, the misleading claims of  a single 
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witness were more damaging to subjects’ memories when that witness repeated 
them; in Experiment 2, the claims of  a single witness were more credible when 
that witness repeated them.8 In both experiments, one witness’s repeated claims 
were as influential as three witnesses each making the same claims once. These 
findings fit with research showing that repeating information makes it more 
available—and seem more familiar, true, or even representative of  a population 
(Kelley & Lindsay, 1993; Weaver et al., 2007; Unkelbach, 2007).
However, our results do not fit with those of  Mitchell and Zaragoza (1996). 
When Mitchell and Zaragoza gave subjects misleading information in three 
presentation styles (written, video, audio), subjects were more misled than when 
they were given repeated misleading information in only one presentation style 
(e.g., audio). Their findings do not fit with ours as their source manipulation 
interacted with repetition, while our source manipulation did not. 
But three important differences between the methods of  this study and those 
of  Mitchell and Zargoza’s (1996) may explain this discrepancy. First, although 
Mitchell and Zaragoza used a source test—asking subjects to state whether they 
remember the information from the video or the postevent information—we used 
a standard recognition test, asking subjects to choose between the original and 
postevent information. Indeed, research on the effects of  repetition have shown 
that people are more likely to use source information when engaged in deliberate,  
recollective based, processes such as during a source test than when using faster, 
recognition based, decision making such as during a recognition test (Begg et al., 
1992; Unkelbach & Stahl, 2009). Second, when Mitchell and Zaragoza 
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8 Experiment 2 was replicated using the online subject pool Mechanical Turk and web-based experiment software. See Appendix A 
for the replication.
manipulated presentation style, it may have interacted with repetition not because 
the source of  the information became more trustworthy, but because it became 
more salient. By contrast, we manipulated only the generic name of  the source 
(for instance, Witness 5 vs. Witnesses 5, 9, and 16). It may be that salience is what 
drove Mitchell and Zaragoza’s subjects to be more misled. Finally, whereas we 
embedded our misinformation in a narrative, Mitchell and Zaragoza embedded 
their misinformation in questions. Although both approaches lead people to 
misremember the original event, they differ in a number of  qualitative 
characteristics that may affect people’s ability to do good source monitoring 
(Zaragoza & Lane, 1994). But clearly, the question of  why broadly similar 
methods produced different patterns of  results is an important one worthy of  
future research.
Why would one witness repeating a claim become just as credible as three 
witnesses? Two possible mechanisms may explain these surprising results. On the 
one hand, it may be that a single witness repeating claims is seen (correctly) as 
highly consistent—an attribute that makes the witness appear more credible 
(Brewer & Burke, 2002). By comparison, when multiple witnesses all converge on 
the same claim, the claim may become credible simply because many people 
made it (Harris & Hahn, 2009; Ross et al., 1998). In other words, one witness 
repeating a claim may make the claim more credible for a different reason than 
three witnesses each stating the same claim once does. Indeed, non-significant 
trends in our data lend support for this possibility: A closer inspection of  Figures 
2.2 and 3.1 suggests that subjects were slightly more misled by, and more 
confident about, claims repeated by a single witness than those repeated by three 
witnesses.
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On the other hand, it may be that people do not account for the number of  
witnesses stating a claim. That is, when people determine the credibility of  a 
claim, they might rely on heuristically driven monitoring processes—using the 
familiarity of  the claims to determine their credibility—while forgoing more 
effortful monitoring processes that would help them scrutinize the source of  the 
claims instead. 
In Experiments 3 through 5, we explore how either consistency and consensus  
(experiments 3 and 4) or a failure to effectively monitor the source of  the 
information (experiment 5) may explain our findings. In Experiments 3 and 4 we 
ask how the consistency of  a single witness may inflate credibility, while in 
Experiment 5 we ask if  increasing subjects’ ability to monitor the source of  the 
information will decrease subjects’ reliance on the repeated testimony of  a single 
witness.
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Chapter 4
Experiment 3
In Experiments 1 and 2, we asked if  the repeated claims of  a single witness 
are as credible as the same claims made by multiple witnesses. Our findings 
suggest that what matters is repetition: Subjects found the repeated claims of  a 
single witness as credible as claims made by multiple witnesses once each. In the 
following experiments, we address mechanisms that might drive this effect. 
To get a handle on the mechanism, we first make a distinction between 
consensus and consistency. Consider the possibility that what gives rise to the 
credibility of  multiple witnesses is the consensus of  claims, whereas what gives rise 
to the credibility of  a single witness is its consistency. 
Consensus 
As I discussed earlier, consensus among a group of  people can be a good 
measure of  what is true. Moreover, our faith in multiple witnesses makes sense. To 
the extent multiple witnesses are providing independent sources of  information, 
they are less likely to all have the same wrong information than one witness would 
be (see also Dechêne et al., 2010). For example, if  a witness to a crime reported 
that the burglar wore a uniform from "AJ's Electricians", then it may not be 
surprising to later find that the uniform was really from "RJ's Electricians." After 
all, people sometimes make mistakes. Conversely, had three independent 
witnesses all claimed the uniform was from "AJ's Electricians" then it would be 
surprising—although not unheard of—to find that the uniform was really from 
“RJ’s Electricians.” People might logically have a thought like this: “If  all three 
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witnesses had been wrong, why would all three converge on the same wrong 
detail?”
Consistency
We also know that consistency matters when judging the credibility of  the 
information a person provides. The psychology and law literature finds that jurors 
and judges alike believe that inconsistencies across a witness's repeated testimony 
is a sign that little of  what the witness says is credible (Berman, Narby, & Cutler, 
1995; Fisher, Brewer, & Mitchell, 2009; Uviller, 1993). More specifically, when 
one witness gives several accounts of  a crime people find the testimony more 
credible when it is consistent than when it is inconsistent (Berman et al., 1995; 
Brewer & Burke, 2002). Similarly, when people hear the repeated, consistent, 
opinion of  a single person they are more likely to believe that the opinion is held 
by others than if  the opinion was never repeated (Weaver et al., 2007).
Taken together, the research on consensus and consistency offer two different 
mechanisms that would each lead to a similar effect of  repetition regardless of  
how many witnesses repeated the information. More specifically, it may be that if  
three witnesses each report a claim once, then the claim gains credibility for a 
different reason than if  one witness repeats the claim three times. This hypothesis 
suggests a way to understand the findings from Experiments 1 and 2 which show 
that subjects find the repeated claims of  a single witness as credible as claims from 
multiple witnesses. 
But what drove these findings is the focus of  the next series of  experiments. 
The research on consensus and consistency leads us to predict that highlighting 
inconsistent details across multiple witness reports should produce different effects  
depending on whether the reports are attributed to one witness or three witnesses. 
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If  subjects see the overlapping claims of  multiple witnesses as credible because 
there is a consensus, then highlighting inconsistencies should have little effect on 
the credibility of  their overlapping claims. Conversely, if  subjects see the repeated 
claims of  a single witness as credible because of  consistency, then highlighting 
inconsistencies should decrease the credibility of  the repeated claims.
In Experiment 3, subjects first read the three witness reports that repeated 
specific details across the reports. For half  of  the subjects, we again attributed all 
three reports to a single witness. For the other half, we attributed the reports each 
to a different witness. Additionally, half  of  the subjects read reports that 
contained some peripheral inconsistencies. Later, everyone was asked how 
confident they were that certain claims were true of  the crime. We hypothesized 
that the inconsistencies across witness reports would reduce the credibility of  a 
single witness’s repeated claims more than the claims made by multiple witnesses 
once each.
Method
Subjects
One hundred and twenty-eight introductory psychology students completed 
the experiment as part of  a course requirement. Subjects completed the 
experiment in groups of  1 to 5.
Design
We used a 2 (source: one witness, three witnesses) x 2 (item type: specific, 
control) x 2 (consistencies: consistent, inconsistent) mixed factors design 
manipulating source and consistencies between subjects, and item type within 
subjects.
Procedure
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The procedure described below was the same as Experiment 2 with two 
exceptions: 1) for all subjects, the critical—specific—claims were repeated across 
all three reports; and 2) for half  of  the subjects, the three reports contained three, 
non-critical, details that were inconsistent across the reports.
The reading phase of  Experiment 3 was identical to that of  Experiment 2 
with the exception of  our manipulation of  consistency. For half  of  the subjects 
three—non-critical—claims were inconsistent between the three reports. For 
example, in one report, Eric is said to have taken a hammer out of  his van, in 
another report it was a screwdriver he took out of  the van, while in yet another 
report it was a wrench. For these subjects, three different items (the tool taken out 
of  the van; the type of  documents on the counter; where he put a ring) were 
inconsistent across the three reports. For other subjects, these three claims were 
consistent across all three reports.
Subjects completed a five minute pattern completion filler task after reading 
all of  the reports. All subjects were then asked to complete the 20-item standard 
confidence test used in Experiment 2, and were later debriefed.
Results and Discussion
Recall that if  the repeated claims of  a single witness convey consistency while 
the repeated claims of  multiple witnesses convey consensus, then adding 
inconsistencies across the witness reports should make subjects less confident 
about the repeated claims of  a single witness than the repeated claims of  multiple 
witnesses. To address this prediction, we calculated subjects’ confidence test scores  
and display them in Figure 4.1.
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Figure  4.1.  Mean  Con1idence  Ratings  of  Speci1ic  and  Control   Claims  by  Consistency  and  Number  of  Witnesses  in  Experiment  3.  Error  bars  represent  a  95%  con1idence  interval.
Figure 4.1 shows two important findings. First, the comparison between the 
first and second black bars, as well as the third and fourth black bars, show that 
adding inconsistencies to the reports mattered: Subjects who read reports 
containing inconsistencies were less confident about the repeated specific claims 
than subjects who read reports lacking inconsistencies. Second, this pattern was 
true regardless of  the number of  witnesses who made those claims. In short, and 
contrary to our prediction, the addition of  inconsistencies similarly affected the 
credibility of  claims made by a single witness and multiple witnesses.
In other words, a 2 (source) x 2 (item type) x 2 (consistencies) ANOVA found 
an item type x consistencies interaction, F(1,124) = 5.77, p = .02, ηp2 = .04. 
Moreover, regardless of  how many witnesses made the reports, subjects were less 
confident about specific claims from inconsistent reports (M = 4.24, SD = 0.65) 
than specific claims from consistent reports (M = 4.51, SD = 0.48), t(126) = 2.71, 
p < .01 , d = 0.48. There was no difference in people’s confidence about the 
control claims between the inconsistent (M = 2.34, SD = 1.05) and consistent (M 
= 2.01, SD = 0.77) reports, t(126) = 1.51, p = .13, d = 0.27, and no tests of  source 
were significant, all Fs < 1.34. Taken together, these results suggest that damaging 
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the consistency of  the reports reduced the credibility of  the claims in those 
reports, but it did not matter how many witnesses had made those reports.9
Criticisms and Counterexplanations
Why did adding inconsistencies across the witness reports fail to make subjects  
less confident about the claims made by a single witness relative to the claims 
made by multiple witnesses? One counterexplanation is that our attempt to 
convey the inconsistencies in the reports was too weak. This counterexplanation 
may be true for three reasons. First, given the amount of  information subjects 
were exposed to, they may not have noticed all of  the inconsistencies. Second, 
given that the first report had no previous information to be inconsistent with, it 
would have been impossible for subjects to notice any of  the inconsistencies until 
they read the second report. Third, the presence of  inconsistencies alone may not 
have been enough for subjects to reflect on how those inconsistencies should affect 
their judgments of  confidence. In other words, even if  subjects did notice all of  
the inconsistencies, they may not have reflected on how that related to the items 
that are consistent. Indeed, the relatively small—but uniform—decrease in 
confidence when the reports contained inconsistencies suggests that at least one of 
these counterexplanations may be true.
 In Experiment 4, we sought to address these counterexplanations by 
highlighting the inconsistencies across the three reports. We told half  of  the 
subjects that the overall accuracy of  the three witness reports were in the bottom 
10% of  accuracy. In addition, subjects rated how accurate they believed each 
report was, and how accurate the three reports were combined, before 
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9  We conducted a separate misinformation effect experiment using the same materials as Experiment 3. The findings of this 
experiment parallel those of  Experiment 3, and appear in Appendix B.
completing the standard confidence test. If  the pattern in Experiment 3 was 
driven by a failure to either a) notice the inconsistencies, or b) reflect on how those 
inconsistencies should affect their judgments of  confidence, then Experiment 4 
should show differential effects depending on whether the claims are attributed to 
one witness or three witnesses. 
Experiment 4
Method
Subjects
Two hundred and fifty subjects accurately completed all phases of  the 
experiment. They were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.
Mechanical Turk is an online subject pool in which workers can complete 
short tasks for a small contribution towards an Amazon gift voucher. Research on 
Mechanical Turk demonstrates that it can provide a subject pool as diverse as a 
university student population, and that the data from experiments conducted 
both in-lab and online using Mechanical turk are comparable (Buhrmester, 
Kwang, & Gosline, 2011; Germine, Nakayama, Duchaine, Chabris, Chatterjee, & 
Wilmer, 2012; Mason & Suri, 2011).10 Because subjects were randomly assigned 
to conditions, the four between subjects conditions were not evenly distributed. 
After the removal of  subjects who failed the requirements outlined in the results 
section below there were 60, 58, 46, and 58 subjects in the one witness/warning, 
one witness/no warning, three witnesses/warning, and three witnesses/no 
warning conditions respectively.
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10 Appendix A also demonstrates an experiment that is a replication of Experiment 2 using the Mechanical Turk subject pool. The 
results of  that experiment, and Experiment 2 are highly similar.
Design
We used a 2 (source: one witness, three witnesses) x 2 (item type: specific, 
control) x 2 (inaccuracy warning: warning, no warning) mixed factors design 
manipulating witness and inaccuracy warning between subjects, and item type 
within subjects.
Procedure
The procedure described below was similar to the method used in 
Experiment 3, but was conducted online, and all subjects received the inconsistent 
reports. The experiment was programmed with Real Software’s Real Studio Web 
Edition, it was displayed via the subject’s web browser, and took approximately 15 
minutes to complete. Subjects first responded to a few demographic questions 
(age, gender, and geographic location)11 before reading the instructions. 
We told subjects they would read three witness reports ostensibly written by 
other people in a previous experiment. Following our previous manipulation of  
source, we told half  of  the subjects that they would be reading all three of  the 
reports made by a single witness, and the other half  that they would be reading 
one report from each of  three different witnesses. To manipulate attention to 
inconsistencies, half  of  the sample received this warning at the end of  the 
instruction phase:
You should be aware that these reports were written by [an eyewitness/eyewitnesses] 
who participated earlier in this experiment, and whose overall accuracy was in the 
bottom 10%. That is, 90% of  the eyewitnesses were more accurate overall in 
describing the crime than [this eyewitness/these eyewitnesses].
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11 Mechanical Turk allows researchers to sample from only one country, or from all countries—there are no in-between options. 
Therefore, to restrict subjects to native English language speakers while maximizing sample size, we limited the experiment to people 
in the US. 
After reading the instructions, everyone read the three witness reports used in 
Experiment 3 with the exception that all subjects received the inconsistent 
reports. An introduction screen between each report emphasized whether the 
report came from the same or a different witness than the last report.
Between each report, we asked subjects to rate “How accurate do you believe 
this witness is?” on a scale from 1 (not at all accurate) to 5 (very accurate). At the 
end of  the third report and rating, we then asked subjects to consider the reports 
overall and rate “How accurate do you believe [this witness was/these witnesses were]?” 
using the same 1 to 5 scale. Then everyone completed a 5 minute number 
matching filler task.
In summary, there were four between-subjects conditions: 1) three witnesses 
with no inaccuracy warning; 2) one witness with no warning; 3) three witnesses 
with the warning; and 4) one witness with the warning.
Next, subjects completed the confidence test. The confidence test was 
identical to the confidence test used in Experiment 3, with the exception that 
items appeared one at a time.
Finally, we asked subjects to respond to five questions with the assurance that 
they would receive credit regardless of  their responses: 1) Did you read all of  the 
reports?, 2) Is English your first language?, 3) How many witness reports did you 
read?, 4) Did we tell you that all of  the reports were written by the same witness, 
or that each of  them was written by a different witness?, and 5) Did we tell you 
about the accuracy of  the witness reports? If  so, where did the witness(es) rank in 
terms of  accuracy? These questions served to determine who read and followed 
the instructions. Afterwards, everyone was debriefed. 
Results & Discussion
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We removed one subject from the dataset who admitting to not reading all of  
the reports. We also removed another 27 subjects (11%) who, on the test, 
responded only 1 or 5 on 90-100% of  their answers, a pattern suggestive of  a 
response set. In the analyses we report here, the pattern of  results was similar 
when these subjects were or were not in the dataset. 
Warning Manipulation
Before turning to the main findings, we first verified that our warning 
manipulation was effective by first calculating the mean rating subjects gave about 
the overall accuracy of  the reports, then classifying these data by whether subjects  
were in the one witness or three witnesses condition, and then by whether they 
received the inaccuracy warning. In line with our manipulation, we found that 
when we warned subjects about the witness’s accuracy, they indeed believed the 
reports were less accurate. In addition, subjects believed the reports of  three 
witnesses were more accurate than those of  one witness.
Put another way, a 2 (source) x 2 (warning) ANOVA found a main effect of  
warning, F(1,217) = 54.30, p < .01, ηp2 = .20; Mwarning = 2.94, SD = 0.95 vs. Mno 
warning = 3.78, SD = 0.71). There was also a main effect of  source, F(1,217) 
=18.99, p < .01, ηp2 = .08; Mone witness = 3.14, SD = 1.02 vs. Mthree witnesses= 3.66, 
SD = 0.72). There was no interaction, F(1,217) = 0.75, p = .39, ηp2 < .01.12
Confidence 
To reiterate the hypothesis, recall that if  the repeated claims of  a single 
witness convey consistency while the repeated claims of  multiple witnesses convey 
consensus, then subjects warned about the accuracy of  the reports should find the 
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12 Due to a software malfunction, the dependent measure for this analysis was not recorded for one subject. Data from this subject 
was removed for this analysis only.
repeated claims of  a single witness less credible than subjects who did not receive 
the warning. Conversely, subjects warned about the accuracy of  the reports 
should not find claims made by multiple witnesses once each less credible than 
subjects who were not warned.
To address this prediction we calculated each subject’s mean confidence 
ratings for the eight critical claims. We classified these data first by whether they 
were control or specific claims, second according to the number of  witnesses who 
made those claims, and third according to whether subjects received the 
inaccuracy warning. These results appear in Figure 4.2
.
EW’s Repetition Specific Generic
One Not Warned
One Warned
Three Not Warned
Three Warned
4.29 2.07
4.03 2.05
4.16 2.00
4.32 1.74
0.16 0.16 4.45 2.23
0.16 0.18 4.19 2.23
0.16 0.16 4.32 2.16
0.18 0.18 4.50 1.92
1
2
3
4
5
Not Warned Warned Not Warned Warned
Specific
Control
M
ea
n 
Co
nf
id
en
ce
One Witness Three Witnesses
Bars%represent%95%%CIFigure 4.2. Mean Confidence Ratings of Specific and Control Claims by Number of Witnesses and Warning in Experiment 
4. Error bars represent a 95% confidence interval.
Figure 4.2 reveals three important findings. First, comparing the black bars in 
the first and third position tells us that subjects were similarly confident about the 
repeated claims of  a single witness and the repeated claims of  multiple witnesses 
when subjects did not receive a warning about the accuracy of  the reports. 
Second, the comparison between black bars on the left side of  the dashed line 
tells us that when reports were attributed to one witness, warning subjects that the 
reports were inaccurate reduced confidence in the repeated, specific claims. And 
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third, the comparison between black bars on the right side of  the dashed line tells 
us that, when reports were attributed to three witnesses, the warning did not 
reduce confidence in the specific claims. Most importantly, the warning led 
subjects to find the repeated claims of  a single witness less credible than the 
claims made by multiple witnesses one time each.
In other words, a 2 (source) x 2 (item type) x 2 (warning) ANOVA found an 
source x item type x warning interaction, F(1,218) = 7.22, p < .01, ηp2 = .03. 
Followup t-tests found that in the no warning condition subjects were similarly 
confident about the repeated, specific, claims made by a single witness and the 
claims made by multiple witnesses once each, t(114) = 1.11, p = .27, d = 0.21. But 
in the warned condition subjects were less confident about the repeated claims 
made by a single witness than the claims made by multiple witnesses, t(104) = 
2.51, p = .01, d = 0.49. In addition, subjects in the three witnesses condition were 
similarly confident about the specific claims when they were warned and when 
they were not warned, but subjects in the one witness condition were less 
confident t(102) = 1.26, p = .21, d = 0.25, t(116) = 2.41, p = .02, d = 0.45 
respectively.
In short, we found support for our hypothesis: Drawing subjects’s attention to 
the inaccuracies in witness reports reduced the credibility of  a single witness’s 
repeated claims more than the claims made by multiple witnesses once each. This 
finding fits well with the consensus and consistency literature and suggests that 
because the credibility of  the claims repeated by a single witness were built on the 
consistency of  that witness, drawing attention to the inconsistencies between 
reports reduced the credibility of  those claims. Conversely, the findings also 
suggest that because the credibility of  claims made by multiple witnesses once 
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each were built on the consensus of  independent sources, drawing attention to the 
inconsistencies between reports did not reduce the credibility of  those claims.
Criticisms and Counterexplanations
A closer inspection of  Figure 4.2 reveals that when given a warning, subjects 
found the control claims less credible in the three witnesses condition than in the 
one witness condition, t(104) = 2.70, p < .01, d = 0.53. How might we explain this 
change in the credibility of  control claims? It may be that subjects in this 
condition were more wary of  claims that none of  the three witnesses mentioned 
because they knew that the witnesses were inaccurate, but did not believe they 
were inaccurate on the specific claims that had consensus. This may have resulted 
in subjects overcompensating with the control claims. Regardless of  the reason, 
while subjects were less confident about control claims in this condition, they were 
also slightly (but non-significantly) more confident about specific claims. This 
finding suggests that our pattern of  results cannot be explained simply as a shift in 
criterion.
A critic might say that because the warning was not about inconsistencies and 
was instead a broad warning about overall accuracy, then we cannot conclude 
that we drew subjects’ attention to the inconsistencies, but rather to some general 
inaccuracy in the reports. But being inconsistent is—by definition—being 
inaccurate, 13 while being inaccurate does not necessarily mean being inconsistent. 
In other words, there are myriad ways to be inaccurate, and inconsistency is just 
one of  them. Because the reports explicitly contained inconsistencies but no other 
inaccuracies, it seems reasonable to conclude that the warning drew subjects’ 
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13 In our experiment, we manipulated inconsistency by making reports contradict one another. It might be argued that inconsistency 
may have a broader definition that would encompass reminiscence—when people add details to later memory reports that did not 
contradict earlier reports. This latter definition would not be, by definition, inaccurate.
attention specifically to the inconsistencies. But let us consider for a minute that 
the critic is correct, and that the inconsistencies did not drive the results in 
Experiment 4. If  so, then a broader explanation of  the results—one explained at 
a more general level of  inaccuracy—would suffice. A broader explanation would 
apply to inconsistencies and other forms of  inaccuracy similarly. Accordingly, it is 
parsimonious to opt for the lesser of  the two explanations: that inconsistencies 
decreased subjects’ over-reliance on the repeated claims of  a single witness. Of  
course, the question of  whether any form of  inaccuracy, rather than inconsistency 
alone, would reduce over-reliance is an important one worthy of  future research.
A different explanation for our results is that they had little to do with 
inconsistency but rather had to do with the warning acting as a source monitoring 
cue. This source monitoring account might explain our findings in two ways. The 
first is relatively uninteresting: Without the inaccuracy warning, subjects might 
simply not notice how many witnesses make a claim—a weak explanation given 
our earlier work showing that people are sensitive to both the number of  
witnesses and the timing of  their claims. The second process is more interesting: 
Although subjects notice and encode information about how many witnesses 
make the claims, they fail to use that information when assessing the credibility of 
the claims unless given a cue—such as our warning—to do so. In Experiment 5, 
we sought to address this source monitoring account of  our results.
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Chapter 5
Experiment 5
As I discussed in the introduction, research using the source monitoring 
framework has demonstrated that people sometimes use easy, heuristically driven, 
processes to judge the credibility of  the source of  information, while other times 
they use more effortful processing to do so (Johnson et al., 1993; Lindsay, 2008). It 
may be that people forgo these more effortful monitoring processes needed to 
recognize that the repeated claims of  a single witness should be considered less 
credible than the claims of  multiple witnesses. Instead, people may be using the 
familiarity of  claims—a heuristically driven process—to judge the claim’s 
credibility (Johnson et al., 1993; Lindsay, 2008).
Indeed, we know that previous encounters make information feel more 
familiar, which is often interpreted as truth (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Arkes et 
al., 1991; Dechêne et al., 2010; Lindsay, 2008; Weaver et al., 2007). As a result, 
repeated information feels more true than unrepeated information, regardless of  
the source.
If  this account is true, then encouraging people to use more effortful 
monitoring processes when judging the credibility of  a claim should lead to 
different effects depending on whether claims were made by a single witness or 
multiple witnesses. More specifically, if  people are relying on repetition—without 
using source knowledge—to judge credibility, then increasing their use of  effortful 
monitoring processes should reduce the effects of  repetition and instead focus 
their attention on the consensus among multiple witnesses. 
Method
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Subjects
The subjects were 75 introductory psychology students who completed all 
phases of  the experiment as part of  a course requirement, participating in groups  
of  1 to 5. One subject was removed due to an experimenter error, leaving 74 
subjects in the dataset.
Design
We used a 2 (source: one witness, three witnesses) x 2 (item type: specific, 
control) x 2 (test type: standard, source) mixed factors design. We manipulated 
both source and test type between subjects, and item type within subjects.
Procedure
Experiment 5 used some of  the same materials that had been used in 
Experiments 2 and 3, but half  of  the subjects completed a confidence test with a 
source monitoring component. In total, there were two important changes 
between Experiment 3 and Experiment 5: 1) the reports did not contain the three 
inconsistencies used in Experiment 3; and 2) half  of  the subjects completed a 
confidence test with a source monitoring component.
Subjects began by receiving the same instructions used in Experiments 2 and 
3, and were asked to read the three witness reports, one at a time. We did not ask 
subjects to rate how accurate they believed the reports were.
In the testing phase, half  of  the subjects completed the standard confidence 
test used in Experiments 2 and 3. The other half  completed the confidence test 
with a source monitoring component.14 For each item in the source test, subjects 
first responded if  they read about each claim in the witness reports. If  they 
responded that they did not read about the claim, an arrow directed them to rate 
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14 14  A sample item from the source testt appears in Appendix D.
their confidence that the claim was true about the way the crime unfolded. If  they 
responded that they had read about the claim in the reports, an arrow directed 
them to two separate two-alternative forced choice questions regarding 1) in how 
many reports they read that claim, and 2) how many witnesses reported the claim. 
Another arrow then directed subjects to rate their confidence that the claim was 
true.
Subjects also completed a manipulation check, reporting the number of  
witnesses who wrote the reports. We counterbalanced the order of  the 
manipulation check, asking it at the very last part of  the experiment but before 
debriefing, or just before the testing phase; there were no interactions with any 
measure as a function of  this order (all Fs ≤ 1.02). Afterwards, subjects were 
debriefed.
In summary, there were four between-subjects conditions: 1) three witnesses 
with a standard confidence test; 2) one witness with a standard confidence test; 3) 
three witnesses with a source test; and 4) one witness with a source test. 
Results & Discussion
Before turning to our primary question, we carried out a manipulation check, 
examining the data to make sure that subjects knew how many witnesses reported 
each claim. To address this issue, we calculated the percentage of  subjects who 
correctly answered the manipulation check question. In both the one witness and 
the three witnesses conditions, 100% of  subjects correctly identified how many 
witnesses wrote the reports. 
Even though subjects remembered how many witnesses authored their 
reports, we still do not know how well they remembered where they learned 
about each claim. In other words, we do not know if  subjects could recognize that 
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any given claim was repeated. To address this source knowledge issue, we 
examined the data from subjects who completed the source test (n = 39). We then 
calculated—for each of  the four repeated, specific, claims—their responses to the 
source questions. 
Subjects were very accurate on the source test. More specifically, subjects 
correctly recalled that they read about each claim at rates higher than chance 
(chance = 0.50) both when the reports were attributed to a single witness (M = 
0.95, SD = 0.13), and when reports were attributed to multiple witnesses (M = 
0.87, SD = 0.26), t(19) = 15.39, p < .01, d = 7.06, and t(18) = 6.30, p < .01, d = 
2.97 respectively. In addition, subjects were able to recognize that they read about 
the claims in all three reports at rates higher than chance (chance=.5 to read 
question x .5 to number of  reports question = .25) both when the reports were 
attributed to a single witness (M = 0.78, SD = 0.30), and when reports were 
attributed to multiple witnesses (M = 0.70, SD = 0.31), t(19) = 7.76, p < .01, d = 
3.56, and t(18) = 6.35, p < .01, d = 2.99 respectively. Finally, subjects were able to 
correctly remember how many witnesses had repeated those claims (one or three 
witnesses depending on which witness condition each subject was in) at rates 
higher than chance (chance = .25) both when the reports were attributed to a 
single witness (M = 0.66, SD = 0.39), and when reports were attributed to 
multiple witnesses (M = 0.67, SD = 0.30), t(19) = 4.71, p < .01, d = 2.16, and t(18)  
= 6.10, p < .01, d = 2.88 respectively.
We now turn to our primary question: Would encouraging effortful source 
monitoring reduce subjects's confidence in the repeated claims of  a single witness 
relative to claims made by multiple witnesses? To address this question, we 
calculated each subject’s mean confidence ratings for the eight critical claims. We 
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classified these data first by whether those were control or specific claims, second 
according to the number of  witnesses who made those claims, and third 
according to whether subjects completed the standard or source test. These 
results appear in Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1. Mean Confidence Ratings of Specific and Control Claims by Number of Witnesses and Test Type in 
Experiment 5. Error bars represent a 95% confidence interval.
As the figure shows, the answer to our primary question is no: Encouraging 
effortful source monitoring did not have different effects on confidence about one 
versus three witnesses. A closer look at the figure reveals at least two important 
findings. First, comparing the black bars in the first and third position tells us that 
subjects were similarly confident about the repeated claims of  a single witness and 
the repeated claims of  multiple witnesses when completing the standard 
confidence test. And second, the comparison between the first and second black 
bars, as well as the third and fourth black bars, show that completing the source 
test mattered: Subjects who completed the source test became more confident on 
the control, unmentioned claims, but no less confident on the specific, repeated, 
claims than subjects that completed the standard confidence test.
 In short, the source test did not affect subjects's confidence ratings of  the 
repeated claims of  a single witness, and while it did increase subjects's confidence 
in control claims, it did so similarly in both the one witness and three witnesses 
55 
conditions. But contrary to our source monitoring explanation, subjects who 
completed the source test continued to rate the repeated claims similarly 
regardless of  how many witnesses made those claims.
In other words, a 2 (level of  detail) x 2 (source) x 2 (test type) ANOVA found a 
significant interaction between item type and test type, F(1,70) = 34.58, p < .01, 
ηp2 = .33. Moreover, regardless of  how many witnesses made the reports, subjects 
were more confident about control claims when taking a source test (M =3.27, SD 
= 1.06) than when taking the standard confidence test (M = 1.99, SD = 0.74), 
t(72) = 6.11, p < .01 , d = 1.44. In addition, subjects were similarly confident 
about the repeated, specific, claims regardless of  whether they completed a source 
test (M = 4.46, SD = 0.53) or the standard confidence test (M = 4.63, SD = 0.53), 
t(72) = 1.39, p = .17, d =0.33. No tests of  source were significant, all Fs ≤ 0.20.
Our hypothesis that subjects who completed the source test would find the 
repeated claims of  a single witness less credible than the claims of  multiple 
witnesses did not materialize, but we did find an overall increase in the credibility 
of  unmentioned, control claims when subjects completed the source test, t(72) = 
5.99, p < .01, d = 1.41. How might we explain these findings? One possibility is 
that the increased confidence in control claims is the result of  a criterion shift. But 
a closer inspection of  Figure 5.1 reveals there was a small, non-significant, trend 
of  lower confidence in the specific claims when subjects completed the source test 
compared to when they completed the standard test. This trend suggests that the 
increased confidence in control items was not a result of  a criterion shift. 
A more likely explanation is that the increased confidence was a result of  how 
we manipulated control items. More specifically, control items did appear in the 
reports, but in generic format. For example, subjects would have read multiple 
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times that the electrician read a magazine, but not that it was a Time magazine. 
In the source test, subjects may have remembered reading about a magazine on 
several occasions, even if  they did not read about which magazine it was. This 
recognition could lead subjects to partially adjust their scores to reflect that they 
believed part, but not all, of  the information in that claim (e.g., that it was a 
magazine, but not necessarily a Time magazine). An adjustment that may, in 
turn, inflate their credibility rating of  the claim. Regardless of  the reason for the 
increase in subjects’s confidence in control claims, we did not find a similar 
increase in specific claims.
Summary of  Experiments 3-5
Across three experiments, we found that subjects’ overconfidence in the 
repeated claims of  a single witness was driven by the fact that they interpreted 
repeated claims as consistent—an attribution known to inflate people's belief  in 
the credibility of  information (Berman et al., 1995; Brewer & Burke, 2002; Fisher 
et al., 2009; Uviller, 1993). In Experiment 3, we found that adding inconsistencies 
to the reports alone did not differentially affect the credibility of  claims made by 
one witness versus three witnesses. However, in Experiment 4, we found that 
warning subjects about the inaccurate witness or witnesses did decrease 
confidence in the repeated claims of  a single witness, but not the claims of  
multiple witnesses. In Experiment 5, we found no support for the source 
monitoring account of  our findings. When we used a method known to increase 
effortful monitoring processes, subjects showed the same pattern as the unwarned 
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subjects from Experiment 4. This finding suggests the pattern of  warned subjects 
from Experiment 4 was not simply the result of  more effortful source monitoring.
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Chapter 6
General Discussion
Review
In the first two experiments, we asked if  one person who repeats claims wields  
more influence on memory and confidence than that same person making the 
claim only once. We found that the answer was yes. More specifically, in 
Experiment 1, subjects who read the repeated, misleading, claims of  a single 
witness were less accurate than those who read the misleading claims only once. 
In Experiment 2, subjects who read the repeated claims of  a single witness were 
more confident those claims were true than subjects who read the claims only 
once. These findings highlight the important role of  repetition when judging 
credibility. Surprisingly, the repeated claims of  a single witness were as misleading 
(Experiment 1) and as credible (Experiment 2) as the same claims made by 
multiple witnesses once each. In Experiments 3 through 5, we sought to explore 
why.
In our second series of  experiments, we asked if  the reason the repeated 
claims of  one witness were as credible as claims made by multiple witnesses once 
each is that the consistency of  a single witness leads subjects to believe the witness  
is more accurate. In Experiment 3, half  of  the subjects read reports containing 
peripheral inconsistencies. Contrary to our predictions, they continued to find the 
repeated claims of  a single witness as credible as the same claims made by 
multiple witnesses. In Experiment 4, however, we told half  of  the subjects that the 
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witnesses were highly inaccurate—an alert that led those subjects to find the 
repeated claims of  a single witness less credible than the same claims made by 
multiple witnesses. In Experiment 5, we asked if  increasing subjects’ likelihood of  
using effortful source monitoring accounted for these findings. Even in the face of 
a confidence test with a monitoring component, subjects continued to find the 
repeated claims of  a single witness as credible as the claims made by multiple 
witnesses once each.
Consensus and Consistency.
These findings fit with the literature on consistency and consensus. Recall the 
hypothesis that subjects took the repeated, consistent, claims of  a single witness as 
a marker that those claims were true (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Arkes et al., 
1991; Dechêne et al., 2010; Lindsay, 2008). Recall also the hypothesis that 
subjects took the consensus of  multiple witnesses about the same claims as a 
marker that those claims were true (Berman et al., 1995; Brewer & Burke, 2002; 
Fisher et al., 2009; Uviller, 1993). Consistent with the literature on consistency 
and consensus, we found support for these hypotheses in Experiment 4: When we 
warned subjects about the accuracy of  the inconsistent reports, they found the 
repeated claims of  one witness to be less credible than claims made by three 
witnesses once each. Our research furthers this literature by showing that 
consensus and consistency both lead to similar levels of  credibility. In addition, 
this research demonstrates that the over-reliance people have on the consistent, 
repeated, testimony of  a single witness can be ameliorated by warning people 
about inconsistencies.
Source Test.
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In Experiment 5, adding a source monitoring component to the confidence 
test did little to decrease the credibility of  the repeated claims of  a single witness 
relative to the same claims made by multiple witnesses. What might have caused 
this surprising finding? One possibility is that the type of  monitoring that the 
source test encouraged—attending to the source of  the repeated claims—may not 
be the type of  monitoring error driving our effects. As a result, subjects continued 
to see the repeated claims of  a single witness as credible, regardless of  their ability 
to recognize, at test, that it was repeated. Of  course the question of  when people 
can and cannot use more effortful source monitoring to evaluate the credibility of 
information is an important one worthy of  future research.
In addition, Experiment 5 should not be taken to suggest that source 
monitoring plays little role in assessing the credibility of  repeated claims. It stands 
to reason that source monitoring has a primary role. Indeed, Experiment 5 
showed that subjects were very good at monitoring both the source of  the claims 
and whether they were repeated. In addition, Experiment 4 suggests that subjects 
did use their knowledge that the source came from either a single, or multiple, 
witnesses which led to similar credibility ratings for different reasons. Instead, the 
findings suggest that when people have no reason to question the credibility of  a 
single witness’s repeated claims, they use their knowledge of  the source of  the 
claims in a way counter to what intuition suggests: leading them to over-rely on 
the repeated claims of  a single witness.
Counterexplanations
Our findings suggest that the credibility of  claims repeated by a single witness 
is rooted in the consistency of  that witness. As such, drawing attention to the 
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inconsistencies between reports reduced the credibility of  those claims. A critic 
might argue that in Experiment 4, the “bottom 10%” warning did not cue 
subjects to the inconsistencies in the reports, but instead led them to better attend 
to the source of  the claims when reading the reports. This explanation seems 
unlikely given the findings in Experiment 5 showing that subjects were very good 
at remembering both that the claims repeated and the source of  those claims. It 
seems reasonable to assume subjects in all experiments would have demonstrated 
these high levels of  accuracy had they been asked to. Therefore, this 
counterexplanation seems untenable.
Of  course, in the real world, multiple witnesses provide richer source 
information than any we provided here. In court, for example, three different 
witnesses who take the stand will vary on a variety of  dimensions, all of  which 
triers-of-fact could use to distinguish the credibility of  their claims later. Would 
triers-of-fact actually use these richer source cues, and show different patterns of  
remembering when testimony is repeated by one witness or by three witnesses? 
While some research suggests they would use these richer source cues, our 
findings suggest they would not unless given a reason to question the credibility of 
the source (Mitchell & Zaragoza, 1996). Overall, this is an important question 
that needs to be addressed before generalizing our findings to the real world.
Connections to the Wider Literature
Although these findings square with the literature on consensus and 
consistency, they do not square with other research. For instance, Weaver and 
colleagues (2007) found that when subjects read the same opinion from three 
different people, they were more likely to believe it represented the population's 
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opinion than when they read the repeated opinion of  only one person. Recast in 
our framework, Weaver and colleagues found consensus was more important than 
consistency. 
How do we reconcile these inconsistencies between Weaver et al.’s (2007) 
findings and ours? One possibility is that people see the opinions of  others as less 
trustworthy than the memories of  others. This possibility is quite rational: There 
are infinite opinions about some experience, but only one correct memory. For 
example, if  Jennifer asks Owen about the movie The Godfather, Jennifer may not 
trust Owen’s opinion that “it is the best movie ever made,” but she would be more 
likely to trust his account of  the plot. Therefore, Weaver et al.’s manipulation 
might be analogous to our warning manipulation: When people have a reason to 
question the credibility of  information, then consistency becomes less influential 
than consensus. Of  course, the question of  when people will rely on or discount 
the consistency of  repeated information is an important one worthy of  future 
research.
Future Research
Although the results of  this research showed that drawing subjects’ attention 
to the inaccuracies of  the inconsistent reports reduced their over-reliance on the 
repeated claims of  a single witness, they do not tell us whether these effects were 
driven by social or cognitive factors. More specifically, the warning about the 
accuracy of  the reports encompasses both social and cognitive aspects that might 
drive these effects.
Social.
We know from the social psychology literature that social aspects of  witnesses
—such as the relationship among witnesses, or the witness’s motivation—can 
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influence people’s susceptibility to misinformation (Dodd & Bradshaw, 1980; 
French et al., 2008). In Experiment 4, the “bottom 10%” warning conveys a 
similar social aspect: Accordingly, it may have acted as a social cue that the 
witness should not be trusted in general, while not influencing how credible 
subjects found claims made by multiple witnesses. If  this explanation were true 
then other social cues should show similar patterns of  results. Future research 
could address this issue by telling subjects that the reports were written by people 
with either neutral or vested interests. If  the effects of  repetition—that is, the 
difference between the credibility of  repeated claims and the credibility of  
unrepeated claims—from a neutral witness are larger than the effects of  
repetition from a witness with vested interests, then we might conclude that our 
effects were driven by social aspects.
Cognitive.
We also know from the cognitive psychology literature that individual 
differences—such as intelligence, perception abilities, and memory capacity—can 
influence people’s susceptibility to misinformation (Zhu et al. 2010). In one study, 
researchers asked people to take part in a misinformation study, and later 
completed a battery of  cognitive tasks including measures of  intelligence, 
perception, and memory. They found that people with higher intelligence, better 
perception skills, and better memory capacity, were less likely to falsely remember 
the post-event information than other people with lower intelligence, perception 
abilities, or memory capacity. 
It may be that the “bottom 10%” warning helped aid people with lower skills 
on these measures to reduce their over-reliance on the repeated claims of  a single 
witness. If  this explanation were true, then we should find that people with higher 
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scores on these measures find the repeated claims of  a single witness as more 
credible than people with lower scores on these measures.
In summary, continued research is needed to differentiate between the roles 
social and cognitive factors take in how credible people find the repeated claims 
of  a single witness relative to claims made by multiple witnesses.
Final Remarks
Considered together, these experiments demonstrate an intriguing, robust 
phenomenon: that people overestimate the credibility of  the repeated claims of  a 
single witness, and that they do so, at least in part, because the information is 
consistent. These results have important real world implications. For instance, 
lawyers often draw the jury’s attention to inconsistencies between reports in order 
to discredit witness testimony (Berman et al., 1995). But our findings suggest that 
although this technique may work to discredit the repeated testimony of  a single 
witness, it would be much less effective in discrediting the overlapping claims of  
multiple witnesses.
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Appendix A
Experiment 2 was replicated online using subjects recruited from Mechanical 
Turk. Mechanical Turk is an online subject pool in which workers can complete 
short tasks for a small contribution towards an Amazon gift voucher. Research on 
Mechanical Turk demonstrates that Mechanical Turk can provide a subject pool 
as diverse as a university student population and that the data from experiments 
conducted both in-lab and online using Mechanical turk are comparable 
(Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosline, 2011; Germine, Nakayama, Duchaine, Chabris, 
Chatterjee, & Wilmer, 2012; Mason & Suri, 2011).
Methods
Subjects
One hundred and seventy six subjects accurately completed all phases of  the 
experiment. They were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.
Design
We used a 2 (report repetition: repeated, not repeated) x 2 (source: one 
witness, three witnesses) x 2 (item type: specific, control) mixed factors design, 
manipulating repetition and source between subjects, and item type within 
subjects.
Procedure
The method described below was similar to the method used in Experiment 
2, but was conducted online. The experiment was programmed with Real 
Software’s Real Studio Web Edition, it was displayed via the subject’s web 
browser, and took approximately 15 minutes to complete. Subjects first responded 
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to a few demographic questions (age, gender, and geographic location), before 
reading the instructions. 
We told subjects they would read three witness reports ostensibly written by 
other people in a previous experiment. Following our previous manipulation of  
source, we told half  of  the subjects that they would be reading all three of  the 
reports made by a single witness, and the other half  that they would be reading 
one report from each of  three different witnesses. 
After reading the instructions, everyone read the three witness reports used in 
Experiments 1 and 2. An introduction screen between each report emphasized 
whether the report came from the same or a different witness than the previous 
report. Then everyone completed a 5 minute number matching filler task.
Finally, we asked subjects to complete the confidence test. The confidence test 
was identical to the confidence test used in Experiment 2 with the exception that 
items appeared one at a time. Afterwards, everyone was debriefed.
Results and Discussion
We removed 43 subjects (24%) who, on the test, responded only 1 or 5 on 
90-100% of  their answers, a pattern suggestive of  a response set.15 In the analyses  
we report here, the pattern of  results was similar when these subjects were or 
were not in the dataset.
As in Experiment 2, we asked if  repeating claims make subjects more 
confident that they really happened—and if  so, if  the number of  witnesses 
repeating those claims matters. To address this question, we calculated each 
subject’s mean confidence that specific details or actions had taken place. We 
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15 We used a similar criteria for excluding subjects in Experiment 4, but only 11% of subjects matched those criteria in Experiment 4. 
The reason for this difference is that Experiment 4 used an instructional manipulation check to exclude subjects who did not read the 
instructions while this experiment did not. As such, many of the subjects using this response set in Experiment 4 had already been 
removed from the analysis for not reading the instructions, thus reducing the subjects matching this criteria to 11%.
classified these data first according to whether the critical items were described in 
a specific or control level of  detail in the reports, second according to how many 
witnesses the reports were attributed, and third according to how many reports 
contained critical items in a specific level of  detail. These results appear in Figure 
A.1.
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Figure  A.1.  Mean  Con1idence  Ratings  of  Speci1ic  and  Control   Claims  by   Repetition  and  Number  of  Witnesses  in  Experiment  for  Appendix  A.  Error  bars  represent  a  95%  con1idence  interval.
Figure A.1 shows two important results that are nearly identical to those 
found in Experiment 2. First, the comparison between the first and second black 
bars, as well as the third and fourth black bars, show that repeating claims 
mattered: When subjects heard the same specific claim repeated, they were more 
confident that those claims were correct than when the claims were not repeated. 
And second, subjects were similarly confident about repeated claims regardless of 
the number of  witnesses who made those claims. More specifically, subjects were 
no more confident about claims repeated by three different witnesses than they 
were about claims repeated by a single witness.
In other words, a 2 (report repetition) x 2 (source) x 2 (level of  detail) ANOVA 
revealed a significant interaction between level of  detail and report repetition, 
F(1,129) = 14.64, p < .01, ηp2 = .97. Moreover, regardless of  how many witnesses 
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made the reports, subjects were more confident about repeated specific claims (M 
= 4.29, SD = 0.66) than unrepeated specific claims (M = 3.71, SD = 0.80), t(131) 
= 4.44, p < .01 , d = 0.78. There was no difference in people’s confidence in the 
control claims between the repeated (M = 2.00, SD = 0.69) and unrepeated (M = 
2.10, SD = 0.69) conditions, t(131) = 0.79, p = .43, d < 0.14, and no tests of  
source were significant (all Fs ≤ 1.06). Taken together, these results replicate those 
found in Experiment 2.
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Appendix B
We conducted a separate misinformation effect experiment using the same 
materials as Experiment 3, but first showed subjects a video of  the crime.
Methods
Subjects
One hundred and twenty-eight introductory psychology students completed 
the experiment as part of  a course requirement. Subjects completed the 
experiment in groups of  1 to 5.
Design
We used a 2 (source: one witness, three witnesses) x 2 (item type: misled, 
control) x 2 (consistencies: consistent, inconsistent) mixed factors design 
manipulating source and consistencies between subjects, and item type within 
subjects.
Procedure
The procedure described below was the same as Experiment 1 with two 
exceptions: 1) for all subjects, the critical—specific—claims were repeated across 
all three reports; and 2) for half  of  the subjects, we used the same inconsistent 
reports used in Experiment 3.
In this experiment, subjects began by watching the video of  “Eric the 
electrician” and were then given a 15 minute filler task. After the filler task, 
subjects read the three reports described in Experiment 3. Half  of  the subjects 
read the consistent reports, the other half  read the inconsistent reports. 
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Subjects then completed a 3 minute pattern completion filler task. All subjects 
were then asked to complete the 20-item standard confidence test used 
Experiment 1, and were later debriefed.
Results and Discussion
If  the repeated claims of  a single witness convey consistency while the 
repeated claims of  multiple witnesses convey consensus, then adding 
inconsistencies across the witness reports should make subjects less misled by the 
repeated claims of  a single witness than the repeated claims of  multiple witnesses. 
To address this hypothesis we calculated each subject’s mean accuracy for the 
eight critical items. We classified these data first by whether they were control or 
misled details, second according to the number of  witnesses, and third according 
to whether the reports were consistent or inconsistent, and display them in Figure 
B.1.
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Figure   B.1.   Mean Accuracy of Misled and Control Claims by Consistency and Number of Witnesses in experiment for 
Appendix B. Error bars represent a 95% confidence interval.
Figure B.1 shows two important findings that are consistent with the findings 
of  Experiment 3. First, the comparison between the first and second black bars, 
as well as the third and fourth black bars, show that adding inconsistencies to the 
reports mattered: Subjects who read reports containing inconsistencies were less 
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misled about the repeated misleading claims than subjects who read consistent 
reports. Second, this pattern was true regardless of  the number of  witnesses who 
made those misleading claims. In short, and contrary to our prediction, the 
addition of  inconsistencies similarly affected how misleading the claims were 
when made by a single witness and multiple witnesses.
In other words, a 2 (source) x 2 (item type) x 2 (consistencies) ANOVA found a 
marginally significant item type x consistencies interaction, F(1,124) = 2.72, p = .
10, ηp2 = .02. Moreover, regardless of  how many witnesses made the reports, 
subjects were marginally more accurate about misleading claims from 
inconsistent reports (M = 0.57, SD = 0.26) than misleading claims from consistent 
reports (M = 0.48, SD = 0.27), t(126) = 1.84, p = .07, d = 0.33. There was no 
difference in the accuracy of  control claims between the inconsistent (M = 0.72, 
SD = 0.24) and consistent (M = 0.74, SD = 0.21) conditions, t(126) = 0.53, p = .
60, d = 0.09, and no tests of  source were significant, all Fs < 1. Taken together, 
these results show a pattern consistent with the pattern of  results found in 
Experiment 3.
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Appendix C
Witness Reports
Transcript of  Initial Interview
Critical items are underlined for demonstration purposes only and were not 
underlined in the reports given to subjects.
Police officer:
I’m now going to ask you some questions about the events you witnessed. First of  
all, could you please describe the person who arrived at the house?
	
Witness:
Umm, sure. Well, it was a man who drove a blue “AJ’s Electricians” van, and it 
pulled up into the driveway. He had fairly… ummm, average features. Just brown 
hair is all really.
Police officer:
Okay, good. And what did the man do when he arrived at the house?
Witness:
He got his tool belt and a drill kit out of  the van and went to the front door. Oh, 
and he got a key from under a flowerpot to unlock the door. Then, in the house, 
umm in the front hall area, he picked up a note that was next to a vase of  flowers. 
He put that in his pocket and put his drill kit down.
Police officer:
Right. And what did the man do after he put down the drill kit?
Witness:
Um, he went into a bedroom on the right past the bed that was made. And there 
was a dresser past the bed, with a dark cloth over it. He lifted the cloth and 
opened the dresser and uhh, he just had a look inside the drawers.
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Police officer:
He just looked inside?
Witness:
Yeah… But then he saw a wooden jewelry box on top of  the dresser and he 
opened it and took out a pair of  earrings, umm and he put them into his 
pocket…
Police officer:
Okay, and what did he do after that?
Witness:
He went back down the hallway into umm into the living room, and then into a 
lounge, where he opened some French doors. But then he went into the kitchen 
and he took a can of  Pepsi from the fridge. He just had a look around 
everywhere.
Police officer:
Can you remember, was there anything in particular that he looked at? 
Witness:
Ummm, yeah, he like rummaged through a pile of  papers next to a mug on the 
kitchen bench. Then he went to the oven and bent down next to it. He used a 
screwdriver from his tool belt to fix the front panel.
Police officer:
Okay, what did he do after he fixed the oven?
Witness:
He went back down the hallway to another different bedroom. Uhh, then he 
kneeled down to check a power point. And then he had a look around that room 
too 
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Police officer:
What did he do in the room?
Witness:
Well, he tried on this blue cap and looked at himself  in the mirror, but he put the 
cap back on the bed.
Police officer:
Go on.
Witness:
Ummm, he looked through the wardrobe, and then sat on the bed and started to 
flick through a news magazine, but then he just tossed it on the floor. Ohh, and 
then he went to the stereo and tried on a ring, and then he put the ring in his 
pocket. And he also looked through a pile of  CDs, and took one to play on a 
stereo in the lounge.
Police officer:
So from there, he went back into the lounge?
Witness:
Yes. He went back into the lounge and put the CD on and did some more work in 
the lounge. He ummm, he opened a light fitting on the wall and did some things 
with the wiring, but it didn’t work. Then after he did some more adjustments, the 
light came on.
Police officer:
And what did he do after that?
Witness:
Umm he sat down on the couch, turned off  the stereo and turned on the TV 
instead. And he also picked up a red photo album and flicked through. Ummm, 
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then he looked at his watch, turned the TV off  and he uh he got the CD out of  
the stereo and put it into his drill kit.
Police officer:
And then, did he do anything else?
Witness:
He shut the French doors again, and stopped to look at a picture on the wall. 
Ohh and then he went to the bathroom and took some prescription pills out of  
the cabinet - he also put those in his pocket. Then he hurried out the front door 
and closed it behind him.
Police officer:
And then he left?
Witness:
Yes, that was all.
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Witness Report
I saw a man who drove up the driveway of  the house in a blue “AJ’s Electricians” 
van. He pulled up and got his tool belt and a drill kit out of  the van. I could tell 
that he had brown hair, but I couldn’t describe his other features
He took a key from under a flowerpot at the front door, unlocked the door, and 
went into the front hall area. He read a letter that was left for him on a small 
hallstand and put it in to his pocket. 
He looked rather bored and started wondering around, going first to a bedroom 
on the right. He walked past a made bed with bright pink bedspread and over to 
a dresser that had a blue cloth on it, which he opened. He then closed the drawer 
and had a closer look at the things on top of  the dresser. There was a jewelry box 
which he opened, and took out some earrings which he must have liked, because 
he looked closely at them and then put them into his pocket.
The electrician then headed back down the hallway and picked up his drill set 
that he had left there. He opened some big doors in the lounge and then went 
into the kitchen area. He must have been hungry and thirsty, because he then 
took a can of  Pepsi from the fridge and an apple from a fruit bowl. He then had a 
look in the pantry, and flicked through some papers lying around a mug on the 
kitchen bench. After that, he went to the broken oven and fixed the front panel 
with a screwdriver. 
He then headed back out of  the kitchen and down the hallway to a second 
bedroom. There, he bent down and fixed a broken power point. Again, he 
snooped around the room, trying on a blue cap and looking at himself  in the 
mirror, flicking through a news magazine, and even browsing through the 
wardrobe. He didn’t find anything worth taking until he spotted a silver ring and 
pile of  CDs next to the stereo. He put the ring in his pocket and also took a CD.
He then went back into the lounge and put the CD in the stereo while he did 
some work. After that, he worked on the wiring inside a light fitting on the wall 
84 
and finally got it to work again. He then decided to relax on the couch and picked 
up a black remote to turn on the TV. He also looked through a photo album he 
found on a wooden coffee table.
He then must have been in a hurry, because he looked at his watch, turned off  the 
TV and got the CD back out of  the stereo and took that with his drill kit. He 
closed the outside doors that he had opened earlier. Then he stopped to look at a 
picture on the wall, before having a quick look in the bathroom. He found some 
prescription pills in the cabinet and took those too. Then he rushed out of  the 
house and back to his van.
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Transcript of  Followup Interview
Police Officer:
Could you please recount for me, in as much detail as possible, what you 
witnessed?
Witness:
Yes. Umm, the first thing I saw was a blue “AJ’s Electrician’s” van pull up into the 
driveway. The electrician who got out was a fairly young looking man with brown 
hair. He got out of  the van and walked up to the front door of  the house.
Police Officer: 
Could you describe any other physical features of  the man?
	
Witness:
Umm, not really… Just a normal looking man with brown hair.
Police Officer:
Okay, go on…
Witness:
Ummmm, so yeah, he went up to the front door and unlocked it using a key that 
he got from under a flowerpot. He then went into the hallway and found a note 
that had been left for him on a hallway table next to a vase. He left his drill kit in 
the hallway and then he went into a bedroom on his right.
Police Officer:
And what was it that he did in the bedroom?
Witness:
Well, he walked straight over past a made bed to a dresser that had a blue cloth 
over it, and he decided to have a look in the dresser drawers. He didn’t take 
anything out of  the drawer, but he did take a pair of  nice earrings out of  a 
jewelry box on top of  the dresser. 
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Police Officer:
Could you just clarify for me, that he took them?
Witness:
Yeah, he took them and put them into his pocket. He then went back through the 
house and into a lounge area to open some doors. Then he went into the kitchen, 
right next to the lounge, and he took an apple from a fruit bowl and a can of  
Pepsi out of  the fridge. He kind of  just looked through everything, even the 
pantry and a pile of  papers next to a mug on the kitchen counter.
Police Officer:
Did he take anything else from the kitchen?
Witness:
Umm, no. After that he did some work on the oven. He bent down and used one 
of  his screwdrivers to fix the front panel of  the oven, which must have been 
broken. Then he just left the kitchen and went back to the hallway and into 
another bedroom. First he did some work there – he checked a power point, but 
didn’t take long. But then he looked through the wardrobe and tried on a blue 
cap, checking himself  out in a mirror. He didn’t take that either though, he just 
left it on the bed and had a look through a news magazine.
Police Officer:
So was there anything that he took from this second bedroom?
Witness:
Yes, there were some things. He must have spotted the silver ring on the stereo, 
because he tried that on too and put it into his pocket. He looked through a stack 
of  CDs on the stereo and took that too. He must have wanted to listen to it while 
finishing his last job, because he went back into the lounge and played it on the 
stereo there. Then he did his final job, which was to fix a light fitting on the wall. 
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He had to open it and adjust the wires inside for quite a long time before he got it 
to work again.
Police Officer:
And then did he leave the house?
Witness:
No, he ummmm, yeah, after he finished that job, he just sat down on the couch 
and used a remote to turn on the TV. He just sat there and looked through a 
photo album that was sitting on a coffee table. Then he looked at his watch and 
turned the TV and stereo off, but he took the CD with him.
Police Officer:
He put that in his pocket too, to take away?
Witness:
Um, well he put it in with his drill set. Then he shut the French doors he had 
opened in the lounge, and he took some time to look at a picture on the wall. 
Then he went to the bathroom to have a look in the cabinet. He found some pills 
there, in one of  those prescription bottles, and he put those into his pocket.
Police Officer:
And then did the man decide to leave?
Witness:
Yes, after that, he hurried out of  the front door and closed it on his way. 
Police Officer:
Thank you for your help.
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Appendix D
Tests
Recognition Test
You will now be asked some questions about the video you saw. We are testing 
your memory for this video.
Each question has two parts:
1) the first part asks you about a particular item from the video;
2) the second part asks you how confident you are about your answer.
Here is a sample question.
Eric was working in ________
	 a. a house	 	 b. a shop
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
WHEN YOU HAVE READ AND UNDERSTOOD HOW TO ANSWER 
THESE QUESTIONS, TURN OVER THE PAGE AND BEGIN THE TEST.
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1. Eric was wearing _______
a.   overalls 	 	 b. jeans 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
2. Eric ate ________
	 a.  an apple	 	 b.  a banana
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
3. The magazine that Eric read was _______
a. Time 	 	 b. Newsweek
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
4. Eric read the note from the homeowner in the ______
	 a.  kitchen	 	 b.  hallway 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
5. The tool that Eric used in the kitchen was ________
	 a. pliers	 	 b. a screwdriver
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
6. In the lounge the picture Eric looked at was the _______Tower
a. Eiffel	 	 b. Leaning
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
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     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
7. The bed in the first bedroom was _________
a. made	 	 b. unmade
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
8. In the second bedroom, Eric tested a ______
	 a. power point	b. light fitting
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
9. Eric played a _______ 
	 a. video	 	 b. CD
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
10. In the second bedroom, Eric tried on a _______ cap
	 a. blue	 	  	 b. black
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
11. The name of  Eric’s company was  ________
a. AJ’s Electricians b. RJ’s Electricians
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
12. Eric checked the time _______
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a. on his watch	b. on the wall clock
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
13. The jewellery that Eric stole in the first bedroom was ______
	 a. earrings	 	 b. a necklace
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
14. In the lounge Eric looked through a ________
a. journal	 	 b. photo album
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
15. Eric’s van was_________
	 a. blue	 	 	 b. red
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
16. Eric found the house key under a ________
	 a. door mat	 	 b. flower pot
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
17. Eric rummaged through papers that were next to a _______mug
a. yellow	 	 b. white
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
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Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
18. Eric drank a can of  _______
a. coke		 b. pepsi
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
19. In the bathroom Eric stole ________
	 a. pills 	 	 	 b. perfume
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
20. Eric stole ________ in the second bedroom
	 a. money	 	 b. a ring
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
93 
Confidence Test
How confident are you that each of  the following things happened during the 
electrician’s visit? 
Please circle a number to indicate your confidence, where 1 = not at all confident 
and 5 = very confident.
Here is a sample question.
Eric was working in a house.
	
How confident are you that this statement is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
WHEN YOU HAVE READ AND UNDERSTOOD HOW TO ANSWER 
THESE QUESTIONS, TURN OVER THE PAGE AND BEGIN THE TEST.
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1. Eric was wearing jeans.
How confident are you that this statement is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
2. Eric ate an apple.
How confident are you that this statement is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
3. The magazine that Eric read was Time.
How confident are you that this statement is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
4. Eric read the note from the homeowner in the hallway.
How confident are you that this statement is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
5. The tool that Eric used in the kitchen was a screwdriver.
How confident are you that this statement is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
6. In the lounge the picture Eric looked at was the Leaning Tower.
How confident are you that this statement is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
95 
7. The bed in the first bedroom was unmade.
How confident are you that this statement is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
8. In the second bedroom, Eric tested a power point.
How confident are you that this statement is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
9. Eric played a video. 
How confident are you that this statement is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
10. In the second bedroom, Eric tried on a black cap.
How confident are you that this statement is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
11. The name of  Eric’s company was  RJ’s Electricians.
How confident are you that this statement is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
12. Eric checked the time on the clock.
How confident are you that this statement is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
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13. The jewelry that Eric stole in the first bedroom was a necklace.
How confident are you that this statement is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
14. In the lounge Eric looked through a photo album.
How confident are you that this statement is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
15. Eric’s van was red.
How confident are you that this statement is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
16. Eric found the house key under a flower pot.
How confident are you that this statement is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
17. Eric rummaged through papers that were next to a white mug.
How confident are you that this statement is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
18. Eric drank a can of  Coca-Cola.
How confident are you that this statement is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
19. In the bathroom Eric stole pills.
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How confident are you that this statement is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
20. Eric stole money in the second bedroom.
How confident are you that this statement is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5 
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
___________________________________________________
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Sample Item Taken From Confidence Test
I did not read 
about this 
information
 I read about this 
information in the 
eyewitness report(s)
Or
 I read about this information in:
I read about this information from:
1 eyewitness  
report
3 eyewitness  
reports
1 eyewitness 3 eyewitnesses
How confident are you that this statement is correct?
  
     1                     2                     3                     4                     5
Not at all                                                                               Very 
Confident                                                                         Confident
The magazine that Eric read was Newsweek.
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